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CONSCIENCE, OBLIGATION, AND THE LAW. By David Cowan Bayne, 
S.]. Chicago: Loyola University Press. 1966. Pp. xiv, 287. $8. 
I 
Fathe:i; Bayne, p.m.idst "the signs of incipient national decadence 
appearing in the communication arts, entertainment, domestic rela-
tions and government-,visible like beacons in the events surround-
ing th!:! assassination of President K!:!nnedy"-detects "perhaps" a 
"marked resurgence" of interest in the qµestion of whether the civil 
law binds in conscience (p. 3). His answer is a resounding affirmative, 
and his tract aims to destroy the theory that there is such a thing as 
a purely pen.al law which does not oblige obedience under pain of 
sin. The devil in the piece is the idea that tax laws, traffic regulations, 
and liquor controls can be ignored if the violator is willing to accept 
the risk of civil punish:ment. In brief Father Bayne's argument is 
thqt the entire theory of an amoral penal law was the product of an 
historical accident in the first place, that such laws do not in fact 
exist, that the whole idea that they do is logically unsound, and that 
the utility of the concept is absolute zero in any event since there 
are other tools with which to solve any moral problems that might 
exist :relative to, tlw obligation to obey the law. 
The theory behind the concept of the lex pure poenalis "has been 
almost the exclusive concern of Roman Catholic theologians and 
jurists" (pp. 3-4), and it is important to understand the basic assump-
tions underlying the theory in order to set the stage for our discus-
sion. First, one must accept the idea that the law is simply "an ordi-
nance of reason for the common good, promulgated by him who has 
care of the community" (p. 16). Further, it is necessary to assume that 
God exists, that Gqd's plan £-or the universe is forever fixed in eternal 
law, that God created man, t~at man has a human nature, and that 
this human nature is the sa:me in all men (pp. 15-16). God's eternal 
law is reflected in the human natµre of the men he created, and the 
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intellectual distillation of this reflection is the natural law. The nat-
ural law includes a precept that men must obey the ordinations of 
duly constituted authority. This is so because man, being by nature 
a social animal, needs to live in society, and society, being a part of 
God's plan, simply will not work unless people obey the law. It 
would seem to follow, therefore, that arty properly protmilgated law 
merits obedience as a moral imperative, and, perforce, that the lex 
pure poertalis is a logical absurdity. Suarez (1548-1617), however, 
proved the existence of such a body of law, and Suarez, after all, was 
"the greatest Jesuit theologian to the present day" (p. 16). 
The real origins of the idea of a lex pure poenalis may have been 
rooted in clerical pragmatism. One authority, for example, observed 
that civil laws are so numerous and complex that the consequence of 
imposing a moral obligation to obey them all would be tantamount 
to saying that a man runs the risk of venial sin every tune he turns 
around (p. 55). Moreover, if law required moral obedience, the legis-
lator may not have been willing to assume the awesome responsi-
bility of binding his subjects "under the pain of mortal sin" (p. 48). 
Interestingly enough some of the religious orders seem first to have 
devised the doctrine of non-morally binding law to soften the impact 
of their own internal rules (p. 50). Be that as it may, out of some 
felt need to separate at least some of the law from morals, and upon 
the analogy to the tactic adopted by the orders, Suarez formulated a 
theory to prove the possibility of nonmoral civil guilt. True, if law 
is an ordinance of reason performing a function in God's plan, it 
seemingly carries with it enough reflection of the eternal verities to 
compel moral obedience. But, according to Suarez, this conclusion 
overlooks the metaphysic of the law-making function (pp. 41-45). 
Thinking about what laws are needed, drafting laws, and settling 
upon the best law to solve a given problem are intellectual activities 
and reflect the divine plan. Actually choosing to promulgate a law, 
however, is an act of the will. Granting the existence of free will, 
therefore, it follows that the legislator must be free to promulgate a 
law to which he does not intend to have any moral sanction attach. 
Ergo, such laws are indeed possible. 
Having accepted the idea that a lex pure poenalis can exist, it 
still has remained a problem to settle upon the particular laws which 
might fall within the doctrine. A law condemning murder or forni-
cation would not, since these prohibitions simply repeat the impera-
tives of the eternal law which already carries its own moral sanctions 
(p. 32). Granted that a tax law might not figure in the master plaris 
of Providence and is morally neutral, the problem reduces itself to 
determining whether the legislator intended the law to carry a moral 
sanction or not (p. 34). To this end a series of canons of construction 
(pp. 35-38) were created to facilitate inquiry into whether the pur-
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pose of the law was purely temporal, whether the populace believed 
that the measure was nonmoral, whether the civil sanction was so 
severe that a moral sanction would be an unfair addendum, and 
whether the language of the particular law was moral ("No one shall 
... ") or purely penal ("Whoever shall commit ... "). These canons, 
however, are merely indicia and, absent any litmus test, the debate 
could go on ad infinitum. 
Father Bayne's attack on Suarez is really twofold. First, he dem-
onstrates that the practice within the orders was not an appropriate 
precedent from which to draw an analogy (pp. 81-85). Unlike civil 
society, the "religious order is an arbitrary, free, positive society .... 
If they wish to exclude conscience obligation by agreement, no mat-
ter" (p. 85). Second, he rejects Suarez's legislative free will gambit 
which removed law from direct involvement in the eternal and nec-
essarily moral plan of things. Here we reach the heart of the matter 
because "the ultimate focus of the entire question of the moral bind-
ing power of the civil law lies in the true nature of intellect and will 
in the lawmaking process" (p. 106). The truth is, apparently, that the 
legislator's intellect perceives that a certain goal is desirable; the will, 
since it necessarily inclines toward good, inclines toward the intel-
lectually perceived end; the intellect next judges that the end can be 
achieved; and next the will intends the end. But these are only the 
first four steps in the process. Once the determination is made that 
some legislation is fitting and proper, the intellect begins to evaluate 
the various means available to achieve the perceived end; the will 
then approves this decision to find a means; and the lawmaker makes 
a "practical judgment," selecting the precise means. This last judg-
ment, crucial to the Suarez thesis, is merely the denouement in this 
series of acts, and the election of will "follows ... like the conclu-
sion of a practical syllogism" (p. 112). The point of all of this is that 
"the lawmaker's intellect is the all important instant of freedom in 
the lawmaking act" (p. 112). Since law is the product of intellect, it 
partakes of the divine plan and, hence, carries with it a moral obli-
gation upon the part of the people to obey it. 
If law penalized people without regard to fault, of course, there 
would be something to be said for a body of nonmoral law. The law, 
however, has moved toward "the pervasive philosophy of liability 
founded on fault" (p. 149): witness such landmarks as Brown v. Ken-
dall1 and Randall v. Shelton.2 The trend of current thinking toward 
strict liability does not detract from this thesis one iota since this 
trend has proceeded on the "assumption really ... that there is fault, 
somewhere, somehow, of some kind" (p. 176). Indeed, it is plain that 
1. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850). 
2. 293 S.W .2d 559 (Ky. 1956). 
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the "mere penalist position can in fact find little solace in the Anglo-
Saxon common law" (p. 188). 
Lastly, there is no need for a theory of mere penal law. A Jewish 
merchant, for example, can in good conscience violate a Sunday clos-
ing law because these laws oppugn the traditional principle that the 
law must not foster religion (p. 197). Similarly, even though one 
concluded that it would violate the law to utilize the classrooms in 
public buildings for released time classes in religion, "an able moral-
ist" could nonetheless conclude that doing so "would entail no obli-
gation of the conscience obligation" (p. 198). Moreover, since only 
reasonable laws are laws at all, violations of a prohibition enactment 
create no moral problem because they are "an incursion of the right 
of a citizen to make even moderate use of a legitimate product of the 
land provided by the Creator" (p. 199). If the multitudes have fla-
grantly violated a law and the legislature has not reacted, this "no-
torious conduct of the people" (p. 201) apparently repeals any moral 
obligation that otherwise might be present. 
Suffice it to report, Father Bayne enumerates several other inter-
esting canons all of which do seem to compel agreement with his 
assertion that the pure penal theory was never a necessary ingredient 
in the moralist's tool kit in the first place. 
II 
What is one to make of all this? It seems clear that Father Bayne 
is not alone in attacking the idea of a purely penal law. McGarricle 
is mentioned as having published an "incisive polemic" in 1952 that 
was "brashly but well written" (p. 94); but then this work appeared 
in the American Ecclesiastical Review which is merely a "popular 
semi-learned" journal "for the day-to-day guidance of the parish 
priest" (p. 8). T. E. Davitt, S.J., wrote an entire book capsulizing 
the philosophies of a number of theologians in both the free will and 
intellectual camps, and came dmvn on the side of the intellectuals.3 
Davitt merits fleeting mention in the text twice (pp. 94, 106), and he 
is cited in the index not merely for the mention but for the support-
ing notes and his appearance in the bibliography (p. 275). In two 
footnotes not flagged by Davitt's name in the text (pp. 85 n.37, 246 
n.37), however, Bayne does inform us that Davitt had analyzed the 
positions of the great philosophers. Nevertheless, one gathers that 
McGarricle was somewhat flippant and Davitt popularized philoso-
phers, playing the role of a Catholic Will Durant, while Father 
Bayne's book is "exacting and meticulous in its scholarship" (p. xi). 
The scholarship was certainly exacting and meticulous: witness 
the fact that the notes contain verbatim texts of the original Latin 
3. T. DAvrrr, THE NATURE OF LAW (1951). 
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sources. The facile tonclusion that the fault principle is the culmi-
nation of Anglo-Saxon legal evolution, however, causes one to pause. 
We are all so ingrained with the language of fault that this bit of 
conventional wisdom may, in the light of recent warranty and strict 
tort developments, be more the product of a desire for the familiar 
than of a concerted effort to face the facts of twentieth century life. 
In any event, until we sort out our ideology of accident law, this is 
a pretty shaky pillar upon which to build support for any thesis. The 
idea, moreover, that "able moralists" can excuse violations of current 
church-state conventions raises even more doubts about the whole 
enterprise. Indeed, "able moralists" have supported both the free 
will and intellectual lawmaking theories, reminding this reader of 
nothing quite so 1nuch as a dialectical dispute between Moscow and 
Peking over the "true" meaning of Marxist-Leninisn:1.. The truth 
may exist, not in the texts cited by either camp, but, like beauty, in 
the eye of the beholder. 
Indeed, an interesting book might be written about the why's and 
wherefore's of the rise and fall of the pure penal law theory. Why 
should Suarez's thesis have apparently gained such popularity with 
the parish priests? Was it simply because they were sick and tired of 
hearing about petty misdemeanors at confession? Did lawmakers 
really once believe in sin, heaven, and hell to the extent that they 
thought twice about making crime also a sin? Does the current de-
cline in pure penal theory parallel any decline in a literal belief in 
sin even among the clergy? What is the correlation between the de-
mise of pure penal theory and the rise of peripatetic Jesuit law teach-
ers wandering around outside the Catholic law school league? Is the 
theory somehow so alien that it has proved an embarrassment? Or 
does the interment of the theory create a range of new opportunities 
for "able moralists" to review the entire corpus of the law in order 
to come up with a theological restatement of what does and does not 
merit obedience as a question of conscience? There are questions of 
mood and outlook here which ought to challenge a scholar. If Father 
Bayne can tear himself away from his ancient texts and acquire a 
flair for empiricism, sociology, secular history, and the like, perhaps 
he is the candidate for the job. 
Some hint that we are in for a theologian's restatement of law and 
morals may be found in the wholly gratuitous attack on the legal re-
alists which includes even that old chestnut about "Hobbes, Holmes 
and Hitler" (p. 20). It may be that the rise of penal theory paralleled 
the divorce of the church from the evolving capitalist state and was 
somehow related to the divorce between law and morals common to 
Anglo-Saxon legal history. If this was the case, we now have the Je-
suits coming to the defense of the modem welfare-capitalist-consumer 
state, again adding sin to the sanctions of its burgeoning law, but 
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apparently reserving the right to edit obediep.ce to reflect their mm 
views of a proper society. Whether this reflects the emergence of the 
Catholics from an intellectual ghetto, a facet in the struggle with 
"aetheist Communism," a deep urge on the part of all religions to sus-
tain the pillars of any established order, an effort to prove that the-
ologians still have something to say, or an admixture of all these 
£actors remains to be seen. Suffice it to say that this book is a symp-
tom of something, but that it i~ still too early in the game to diag-
nose whether this symptom bodes good or evil for the healthy, prag-
matic development 0£ the corpus juris in this last third of the 
century. 
E. F. Roberts, 
Professor of Law, 
Cornell University 
